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 1. Introduction 
 
The economic importance of technological standards has grown tremendously over the 
past two decades.  The growing recognition of the importance of the standardization 
process has been attributed in large part to the growth of the information technology and 
communications industries, for which standards are critical.  At the same time, there has 
been substantial flux among these organizations: for instance, over the past 15 years, 
consortia and informal standard-setting bodies have in many cases supplanted formal 
national and international standard development organizations (Cargill (2002)).   
 
Because commercial stakes attached to standards and patents have become so important, 
the adoption of technical approaches covered by specific patents, the requirement of 
backwards compatibility with earlier technologies, and the relative emphasis on cost and 
performance have all been highly contentious issues. Unsurprisingly, the financial 
resources devoted by firms to standardization and patenting has increased sharply.1 And 
as discussed in more detail below, firms’ strategic behavior in standards-setting 
organizations has frequently been the subject of litigation in recent years.  
 
Despite their growing role, standard-setting organizations (SSOs) have attracted 
remarkably little empirical attention from economists.  This paper seeks to address this 
gap by investigating the relationship between these organizations’ characteristics and 
their policies governing the disclosure and licensing of intellectual property such as 
patent awards.  
 
Lerner and Tirole (2006) analyze forum shopping by technology sponsors.  The basic 
idea is that the sponsor of an attractive technology can afford to make few concessions 
(such as royalty-free licensing) to prospective users and to choose an SSO that is 
relatively friendly to his cause.  The model thus predicts a negative relationship between 
the extent to which an SSO is oriented to technology sponsors and the concession level 
required of sponsors, as well as a positive association between the sponsor-friendliness of 
the selected SSO and the quality of the standard. 
 
We extend this model in two ways.  First, introducing disclosure policies, we show that a 
higher licensing price should be associated with more disclosure.  Second, we show that 
in settings where there are only a limited number of SSOs, the relationship between 
concessions and user-friendliness may not hold: Sponsor-friendly SSOs may demand 
substantial concessions in order to attract weak standards; by contrast, user-friendly SSOs 
may make weak demands so as to appeal to sponsors with stronger technologies. This 
suggests that the relationship between concessions and user friendliness is likely to be 
weaker when there are fewer SSOs.   
 
                                                 
1Jaffe and Lerner (2004) document that patent filings and litigation have increased approximately three-fold 
in the past two decades.  IBM’s standard-development efforts are estimated to have totaled one half-billion 
dollars in 2005 (http://www.forbes.com/2005/09/26/ibm-software-investments-cz_qh_0926ibm.html 
(accessed March 30, 2006). 
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To test these predictions, we built the first database of SSOs.  Combining information 
from the SSOs’ web sites, records of standard-setting bodies, and information collected 
from surveys and interviews, we compiled a database of nearly 60 bodies. 
 
Our results are largely consistent with theoretical predictions: 
 
• First, we find a negative relationship between the SSOs’ orientation towards sponsors 
and the strength of the concessions they demand.  This significant negative 
relationship continues to hold even when we control for industry effects. 
• Second, the data reveal a statistically significant association between sponsor-
friendliness and the maturity of the technological sub-field in which the standard is 
located, which we suggest should be a proxy for attractiveness. 
• Third, we find that the presence of a provision mandating royalty-free licensing is 
negatively associated with the presence of a disclosure requirement, while weaker 
“reasonable-and-non-discriminatory (RAND)” licensing requirements are strongly 
associated with such a provision.  
• Finally, when we divide the SSOs into those with above and below the median 
number of other SSOs in their technological sub-field, we find that the relationship 
between user friendliness and concessions is considerably tighter among SSOs 
located in classes with many other organizations. 
 
The plan of this paper is as follows.  Section 2 discusses strategic interactions between 
firms during standardization. The related literature is reviewed in Section 3.  Section 4 
presents the theoretical framework.  The data are discussed in Section 5.  Section 6 
presents the empirical analysis.  The final section concludes the paper. 
 
2. Strategic Interactions and Standard-Setting Bodies 
 
Coordination through standardization frequently has substantial economic benefits. These 
include larger markets with greater economies of scale and the greater ability to sell 
complementary goods. Standards can emerge in a variety of ways.  First, de facto 
standards emerge as firms offer competing, incompatible technologies and consumers 
gravitate to a particular technical solution: e.g., the emergence of the Microsoft operating 
system. Second, some de jure standards are selected by government agencies, as was 
done, for instance, by the United States in the context of high-definition television 
(Farrell and Shapiro (1992)).  While government standard setting is a fascinating topic in 
its own right, the very different institutional environment and incentives suggest that it 
should be analyzed separately. Throughout this paper, therefore, we will focus on the de 
jure standardization process through SSOs organized by private parties.  
 
The complexity of the decision-making process and the impact of standards design on 
firm profitability can make the standardization process intensely competitive: 
 
• Standards are frequently formed at an early stage of a technology’s evolution. In 
many cases, there are a variety of promising alternatives among which the 
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standard-setting body must choose. These alternatives’ relative virtues may still 
be uncertain.  
• Being included or excluded from an important standard can have a substantial 
impact on a firm. For instance, having one’s intellectual property deemed 
essential to a new standard can help insure a steady stream of licensing revenue in 
future years. A standard that demands backwards compatibility can insure 
ongoing revenues for a legacy product for many years. 
 
As a result, established and new firms alike are willing to devote substantial effort to the 
standardization process. Standard-setting bodies have established a variety of rules to 
help adjudicate this process. Industry observers often distinguish between traditional 
standards development organizations, which often are open to all willing participants and 
have detailed, often cumbersome procedures for adopting new standards, and special 
interest groups, which are often small, invitation-only bodies which can move rapidly to a 
consensus. Despite the frequently ponderous pace at which traditional standards-
development organizations move, they often perceived to provide a more effective 
“stamp of approval” than special interest groups dominated by technology sponsors. 
Looking more generally across standard-setting bodies, it is clear that these organizations 
fall along a spectrum, with some bodies being more oriented towards technology 
sponsors and others that reflect more the perspectives and concerns of end users. 
 
Because there are typically multiple technological approaches to the same problem, 
standard-setting groups frequently find themselves in competition, whether with other 
standard-setting bodies or even with other standard-setting efforts within the same 
organization. To be sure, these bodies are to a certain extent differentiated, for instance, 
by end-user orientation, the standardization process followed, and the geographic 
composition of the membership. But often SSOs face the difficult choice of whether to 
endorse a standard developed by a different standard-setting body, or instead to proceed 
with the development of a standard of their own. 
 
A natural question is the extent to which the rules of standard-setting bodies are 
enforceable.  If the commitments that firms make in the standard setting process were not 
binding, the value of these commitments would be minimal.  Three bodies of law are 
potentially relevant.2  The first of these is contract law.  SSOs often do not require 
members to sign detailed contracts stipulating their obligations relating to intellectual 
property.  Either the firms are asked to sign general statements agreeing to conform to the 
organization’s rules, or else do not need to sign any statement whatsoever.  (Formal 
policies were quite rare as recently as the early 1990s (Updegrove (2006)).)  Furthermore 
in these agreements, critical phrases—such as “reasonable” and “non-discriminatory”—
are typically undefined.  As a result of these considerations, contract law is not always 
the mechanism chosen to enforce SSO’s rules. 
 
Fortunately for the workings of SSOs, there are two alternatives. Two doctrines in patent 
law are particularly relevant.  “Equitable estoppel” covers situations where a patent 
holder leads another party to believe that it will not enforce a patent against him through 
                                                 
2This review of legal doctrine is based on Cowie and Lavelle (2002), Lemley (2002) and Mueller (2002). 
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misleading actions.  This doctrine has been used to invalidate suits in instances when 
SSO members failed to disclose relevant patent holdings.  Another doctrine, termed by 
Lemley (2002) “implied license,” covers situations when a firm discloses its patent 
holdings but then fails to comply with the restrictions on licensing to which it concurred.  
Once again, the firm’s ability to extract substantial damages from other SSO members 
may be limited. 
 
As a second alternative, the members of the SSO can assert two torts against an SSO 
member who behaves in an opportunistic manner.  Members can claim that the failure to 
disclose relevant intellectual property is a violation of the anti-monopolization provisions 
of the Sherman Antitrust Act.  Alternatively, they can claim that the failure to comply by 
the provisions of the SSO is a form of fraud, or misrepresentation.   
 
Most of the cases to date involving technology-based SSOs have revolved around 
disclosure issues.3  One much-discussed case involved Dell Computer’s patent covering 
the “VL-Bus” standard (a bus is a mechanism to transfer instructions between a 
computer’s central processing unit and its peripherals).  Dell, a leading manufacturer of 
personal computers, was a member of the Video Electronic Standards Association 
(VESA), which also included virtually all other major U.S. computer manufacturers.  In 
the early 1990s, the body began considering a design for computer bus architecture that 
would enable faster graphics displays.  VESA approved the VL-Bus standard, which was 
primarily employed in the 486 family of IBM and “IBM clone” personal computers, in 
1992.  As part of the approval process, representatives of member companies certified 
that they knew of no intellectual property that the standard would violate. 
 
Not until after 1.4 million personal computers were sold employing the VL-Bus standard, 
the FTC alleged, did Dell begin contacting VESA members, and indicating that they were 
violating a patent that it had obtained in 1991.  The FTC claimed that the standard-setting 
body could have readily adopted an alternative design, had they known of Dell’s patents.  
Dell settled the FTC complaint in November 1995, agreeing not to enforce its patent 
against manufacturers employing the VL-Bus architecture.  The firm also agreed not to 
enforce any other technology that it had failed to disclose to standard-setting 
organizations.4 
 
Similarly, Rambus had sued three manufacturers of dynamic random access memory 
(DRAM) semiconductors of violating its patents covering its Sync-DRAM (SDRAM) 
technology. These manufacturers—Hyundai Electronics Industries, Infineon 
Technologies, and Micron Technology—counter-claimed, charging the firm with having 
engaged in fraud and violating the Sherman Act.  In particular, they asserted that the 
company had failed to disclose its patent applications to the standard-setting body in 
which it was an active member.  Rambus had participated in the Joint Electron Device 
                                                 
3There has, however, been at least one recent case involving the interpretation of an SSO’s rules regarding 
licensing of intellectual property (Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm, Inc., Civil Action no. 05-3350 (MLC), 
D.N.J., 2005). 
 
4http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1995/9511/dell.htm.  
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Engineering Council (JEDEC) standard-setting body from 1992 to one month after the 
Dell consent decree was finalized in mid-1996 (when it stepped down).  During this 
period, it only disclosed one patent filing to the group.  Rambus’ critical SDRAM patent, 
which had been filed in 1990, was not disclosed to the standard-setting body.  Indeed, 
internal company e-mails referred to the firm’s intention not to disclose this filing to the 
JEDEC group despite its apparent relevance.  Furthermore, executives discussed 
strategies to demand that other manufacturers undertake licenses once the standard had 
become established.  While the initial trial found that Rambus has indeed committed 
fraud, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit concluded in Rambus v. Infineon that 
Rambus’s obligation to disclose pending patent applications under the JEDEC SSO’s 
policy was very narrow, essentially limited to applications for patents that a party wishing 
to comply with the standard would necessarily infringe in order to comply.5   Since the 
trial record established clearly that Rambus explicitly modified the language of its patent 
claims to try to cover devices with features that were revealed to Rambus in JEDEC 
meetings, there can be no doubt that Rambus violated the intent and spirit of the JEDEC 
policy.  In effect, the appeals court did not dispute that Rambus tried to commit fraud, but 
ruled that it did not succeed. 
 
3. Related Literature 
 
Despite the copious research on standards, it is striking how little work has addressed the 
question of how these organizations are or should be organized.  Many of the papers 
(e.g., Farrell and Saloner (1985)) focus on de facto standard setting, where there is no 
role for an SSO.  Alternatively, a number of works, both in economics and political 
science, have focused on settings where government bodies adjudicate between the 
desires of different parties about possible standards (e.g., Farrell and Shapiro (1992)).6  In 
addition, several papers have considered which settings (e.g., the extent of buyer and 
seller concentration and product differentiation) are suited to the establishment of 
standards (for instance, Hemenway (1975)). 
 
The economics literature on SSOs has largely focused on their role as a forum where 
competitors can resolve conflicts.  In Farrell and Saloner (1988), two firms can choose 
between two incompatible technologies.  They can do so by repeatedly talking with each 
other (when meeting at the SSO), through product market competition (de facto standard 
setting in the marketplace), or through a hybrid between the two approaches.  The SSO in 
their model is a place where the two parties can negotiate, but has no institutional features 
(e.g., rules governing decision-making or requiring concessions from sponsors).  Nor 
would there be a need for more than one SSO in this setting, since the features of the SSO 
do not matter.  The authors show that the committee process is more likely to arrive at a 
                                                 
5Rambus, Inc. vs. Infineon Technologies AG, et al., United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 
01-1449, -1583, -1604, -1641, 02-1174, -1192 (January 29, 2003).  
 
6Besen and Saloner (1989) discuss non-governmental SSOs, but they focus their more analytic 
discussions—whether entailing the development of new theory or narratives that attempt to relate 
institutional features to theory—on de facto standard-setting activity. 
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high-value consensus than product market competition, but that it usually takes longer.  
The hybrid approach is likely to dominate both alternatives.   
 
Farrell (1996) models the standard-setting process as a “war of attrition” between 
sponsors of two competing standards.  Each sponsor, ceteris paribus, prefers her standard 
to be selected and has private information about its quality.  Farrell shows that the higher-
quality technology is ultimately selected, but that the delay is a function of vested 
interests.  Reducing vested interests (e.g., by adopting rules that limit the utilization of 
intellectual property used in standards) reduces delay.  Bulow and Klemperer (1999) 
present, among other innovations, a generalized model in which multiple firms compete 
to get several technologies included into a standard.  
 
Simcoe (2003) similarly depicts the standard-setting process as a “war of attrition” 
between multiple parties, each with their own proposed standard.  He then corroborates 
the model using standards considered by the Internet Engineering Task Force. Rysman 
and Simcoe (2005) stress the importance of SSOs by showing that SSO patents are cited 
far more frequently than a set of control patents, and that SSO patents receive citations 
for a much longer period of time. Furthermore, they find a significant correlation between 
citation and the disclosure of a patent to an SSO, which may imply a marginal impact of 
disclosure. 
 
Aside from this work, however, empirical work on SSOs has been dominated by case 
studies. Most relevant to this work is Lehr’s (1996) documentation of the intense 
jockeying between firms in projects at two standard-setting bodies. Sirbu and Zwimpfer 
(1985) present a case study of X.25, which standardized “packet switching” over public 
networks.  Besen and Johnson (1986) describe seven cases where SSOs reached 
consensus on broadcast standards.  Weiss and Sirbu (1990) examine eleven choices 
between proposed standards made by standard-setting bodies. An older two-part study 
(1978 and 1983) by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission also provides numerous 
examples. 
 
4. The Theory 
 
4.1 Concessions and user friendliness 
 
As in Lerner and Tirole (2006), we explore a setting where the owner of an idea or 
property must convince potential users of its value.  In the bare-bones version of the 
model, the utility of the users of the technology is cbaU ++= , where: 
 
• a  is common knowledge and measures the strength of the proposed standard. 
• b  is unknown to both technology sponsor and users and reflects unobserved quality 
to users. 
• c  is the extent of concessions made to users: e.g., requirements to license intellectual 
property critical to the standard. 
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We assume that users adopt the standard only if U  appears to be positive.  That is, we 
normalize at 0 the users’ utility either from adoption of a competing standard or from the 
status quo. The attractiveness parameter a reflects, among other things, the intensity of 
competition with rival technologies; a technology facing strong competition from 
alternative potential standards is, ceteris paribus, characterized by a low a.  The sponsor's 
profit, π , is a decreasing and (weakly) concave function of  0)(: <′ cc π  and 0)( ≤′′ cπ . 
 
The SSO chosen by the sponsor learns b and decides whether to endorse the technology.  
The SSO’s objective function is a weighted average of user and sponsor benefits, 
απ+U .  Thus, the weighting factor, α , is (the opposite of) user-friendliness. For the 
moment, we assume free entry for SSOs, so there is a continuum of SSOs with different 
levels of user-friendliness.   
 
Let ( )bF  denote the cumulative distribution function. We assume that F  has the 
standard monotone hazard rate property:  ]1[ Ff −   is increasing. This property in turn 
implies that [ ]bbbEbm ≥≡ ~|~)(  grows with b  at a rate lower than 1. Furthermore: 
 
 
 
 
 Timing. We consider the following three-stage game: 
 
(1) The sponsor chooses an SSO, that is α , and a concession c . 
(2) The SSO learns b  (more generally, it could learn a signal ofb ), and then chooses 
whether to recommend the standard. 
(3)  Users decide whether to adopt the standard. 
Formally, the concession c  is chosen by the sponsor. However it can be shown that c  
could alternatively be selected by the SSO, that is, under free SSO entry there is no 
dissonance between the sponsor and the selected SSO with regards to the choice of 
concession.7 
 
The SSO with typeα  endorses the standard if and only if  
 
.0)]([][ ≥+++ ccba πα  
 
The standard is therefore adopted by the users following an endorsement by the SSO if 
and only if: 
 ( )( )[ ] .0≥+++−≥+ cccabbEa απ   (1) 
 
                                                 
7It can further be shown that nothing would change if c  were chosen after the SSO endorses the standard 
and before the users adopt the technology (see Lerner-Tirole 2006). 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )[ ]bbmbF
bfbm −−≡′ 1
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The sponsor then solves  
 
{ } ( )( )( )[ ] ( )cccaFc παπα ++−−1max,  
 
subject to (1).  
 
Proposition 1 (Lerner-Tirole 2006) (i) The weaker the proposed standard, the more 
extensive the concession and the more credible the SSO selected by the sponsor: 
concession ∗c  decreases and sponsor friendliness ∗α  increases with a .  (ii) When 
concessions are (minus the level of) royalties, i.e., p+= 0ππ  and pc −= , the optimal 
α  is smaller than or equal to 1.  It is equal to 1 when the optimal royalty p is strictly 
positive, i.e., when the attractiveness parameter exceeds some threshold. 
 
Intuitively, the sponsor of an attractive technology can afford both making few 
concessions and choosing a friendly SSO (part (i)).  When concessions take the form of a 
low royalty, but the optimal royalty is strictly positive, the SSO is optimally balanced 
( 1=α ) since the sponsor captures and thus internalizes user welfare.  When the optimal 
royalty is a corner solution at the royalty-free level, then 1≤α  as the sponsor makes up 
for the infeasible negative royalty through a more user-friendly SSO (part (ii)). 
 
4.2 Determinants of disclosure 
 
One aspect that was not considered in the earlier paper is disclosure of information in the 
standard-setting process. In our interviews, firms highlighted several costs associated 
with the disclosure of even already-issued patents. In particular, they argued that due to 
the number and complexity of patent portfolios, rivals frequently could not determine 
“the needle in the haystack”: that is, which patents were relevant to a given 
standardization effort.8 By highlighting the relevant patents or applications, in many 
cases firms felt they were disclosing to competitors valuable information about the 
applicability of their patent portfolios and their future technological strategies more 
generally. Second, early disclosure of plans may invalidate the ability to get future 
awards. Third, the undisclosed intellectual property may have multiple uses, only one of 
which is relevant to the standard.  A disclosure can spur efforts to invent around the 
technology and thereby either lead to a sacrifice in profits in unrelated markets, or else 
boost the attractiveness of a competing standard. In such cases, the sponsor would like to 
retain secrecy—or at least ambiguity—of the applicability of its patent portfolio. 
 
Some SSOs demand that sponsors commit to revealing awards and/or applications shortly 
before the standard is endorsed. Others do not require disclosure, although there is an 
understanding that undisclosed patents that are later deemed relevant to the standard will 
                                                 
8As an illustration of the disclosure effect, press releases by firms announcing patents that have already  
been issued have strongly positive reactions (Erturk, et al., 2006). In addition, U.S. legal rules mandating 
trebled damages for willful infringement lead firms to discourage their engineers from even examining the 
patent portfolios of their competitors. 
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be subject to the same pricing principles as the ones that are currently examined by the 
SSO: for example, a royalty-free agreement will as well cover undisclosed, essential 
patents in the future. While in our sample, the same pricing regime (for instance, royalty-
free or reasonable-and-non-discriminatory) applies to both disclosed and undisclosed 
patents, it is not a priori obvious why this is the case. In particular a sponsor who does not 
wish to disclose patent applications, wants to collect royalties on examined patents, and 
yet would like to reassure users as to the possibility of a hold-up, could offer RAND on 
patents disclosed in advance of the adoption of a standard, and a royalty-free treatment 
for undisclosed patents that are subsequently deemed essential.9 
 
Intuitively, disclosure involves a trade-off between reassuring users and not wasting 
intellectual property. On the one hand, the absence of disclosure raises the concern that 
users, once they have invested in the technology, will be held up by the sponsor as a 
missing piece of intellectual property is needed for the most effective implementation of 
the technology. On the other hand, in the absence of hold-up concerns of the users, the 
sponsor would prefer not to disclose applications or technological strategies more 
generally.  
 
In order to investigate the relationship between disclosure policies, pricing and user-
friendliness, let us study the following extension of the basic model. The sponsor has two 
pieces of intellectual property: 
 
• the existing, disclosed patent (or set of patents), that forms the basis for the standard; 
• an “add-on” potential patent, that is subject to an application to the patent office or is 
merely in the pipeline. There is no uncertainty about whether the patent on this add-
on will be granted (nothing changes if the patent will be granted with probability less 
than 1). 
 
There are two states of nature, i.e., two types of sponsors: “good” (probability ρ ) and 
“bad” (probability ρ−1 ). In either case, the add-on patent adds value H  to the standard. 
What differs is the baseline value. For the good type, the add-on really adds to the value 
of the existing technology: the attractiveness parameter increases from a  to Ha + . By 
contrast, for the bad type, the add-on is a missing piece in the initial standard. In its 
absence, the proposed standard has attractiveness Ha −  only, and what the add-on does 
is to restore this attractiveness parameter to its full-implementation value a . Thus, H  is 
a measure of the potential for hold-up. 
The modified timing goes as follows:  
                                                 
9Indeed, such a “mixed regime” has been proposed under the name of “penalty default” by Lemley (2002). 
The European Telecommunications Standards Institute had proposed in 1993 that all essential intellectual 
property rights of a participant not disclosed within 180 days of the inception of a standard-setting project 
would be subject to automatic licensing. This requirement was abandoned in 1995 after pressure from 
information technology firms (for a detailed discussion, see Dolmans (2002)). 
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(i) The sponsor applies to an SSO with parameter α  and disclosure policy specifying 
whether patent applications are to be disclosed (D) or not (ND) upon acceptance. It also 
specifies prices, 0≥p  for the basic technology and [ ]Hq ,0∈  for the add-on (whether 
the latter is disclosed or not).  
(ii) The SSO observes b , and under disclosure, the state of nature; it then chooses to 
endorse the technology or not. If the technology is endorsed and under a disclosure 
agreement (D), the sponsor must disclose the add-on. 
(iii) The users choose whether to adopt the technology and, if so, pay price p . 
(iv) The sponsor receives a patent for the add-on, which is then deemed essential by the 
SSO (if it has not been disclosed earlier) and charges price q  to the users. 
 
The good type incurs disclosure cost 0>d  in unrelated markets, say, when the add-on is 
disclosed (the disclosure cost for the bad type is irrelevant as long as it is strictly positive, 
since the bad type then never has an incentive to disclose). Disclosure of the add-on 
reveals whether the add-on is a true improvement or else just implementation-enabling. 
 
A couple of important points are in order. First, the sponsor cannot do better than 
choosing to contract on whether to disclose and on prices (the contract is an optimal one). 
Because the value added by the add-on patent is the same, H , in both states of nature, it is 
not possible to elicit from users information about the state of nature. Second, we 
implicitly assume that the sponsor cannot disclose to the SSO confidentially, i.e., that the 
disclosure is subject to leakages.  Otherwise, disclosure would always be a dominant 
strategy for the good type (and costless for the bad type). It would just not be perceived 
as costly and would be a non-issue.10 
The game is a signaling game. As will become clear from the expressions of profits, the 
good and bad types have the same preferences over prices p  and q . Thus, we assume 
that the SSO and the users infer nothing about the state of nature from the choice of p  
and q . By contrast, preferences differ as to the disclosure decision, which therefore will 
convey information to the SSO and the users. Second, we will show that the signaling 
game always has a Pareto-dominant equilibrium; we will accordingly focus on this 
equilibrium for comparative statics purposes. 
 
(a) Disclosure 
 
                                                 
10The reader may wonder how the SSO can decide to endorse the standard before seeing the add-on in case 
the policy is one of disclosure. This, however, is not an issue. Because only the good type may in 
equilibrium disclose, the SSO can presume that the basic technology has value a  and accept conditionally 
on checking that this is indeed correct. Mathematically, and following the treatment below, it endorses the 
standard if and only if  ( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ] ,00 ≥++++−++ qpqpbHa πα  
and commits not to endorse the technology if the basic value is Ha −  rather than the claimed level of a . 
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As we noted, only the good type can benefit from disclosure. Letting ∗b  denote the 
SSO’s cut-off, and ( )DD qp +  the proposed prices, users adopt the technology if and only 
if:  ( ) ( ) ( ) .0≥+−++ ∗ DD qpbmHa  
 
Letting 0≥+≡ DDD qpP , the sponsor's expected profit is  
 ( )[ ][ ],1 0 dPbF D −+− ∗ π  
 
accounting for the fact that the disclosure cost d  is incurred only in case of endorsement, 
as is the case in practice. (Note, too, that such conditional acceptance maximizes the 
SSO’s appeal, as it avoids wasteful disclosure when the standard is turned down, that is, 
when ∗< bb .) 
 
And so the good type’s profit under disclosure is: 
 ( )
( )( ){ } ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]{ },1max, 01 dbmHabFHambbad
D −+++−
+−≥
= ∗∗
−∗∗
ππ  
where the set restriction refers to the constraint that the price DP  be non-negative.11 
 
(b) Nondisclosure 
 
Let ρˆ  ( ρρ ≤≤ ˆ0 ) denote the SSO’s and the users’ posterior probability of the sponsor 
being of the good type when there is no disclosure.  Letting  NDNDND qpP +≡  , and bˆ  
denote the SSO’s cut-off, users adopt the standard if and only if: 
 
( ) ( ) .0ˆˆ ≥−++ NDPbmHa ρ  
 
The sponsor's expected profit in the absence of disclosure is type-independent and equal 
to: 
 
( )
( )( ){ } ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]{ }.ˆˆˆ1ˆˆˆ max,ˆ 01 bmHabFHambbaND +++−+−≥= − ρπρρπ  
 
                                                 
11If at the optimum 0>DP  , then there is an indeterminacy as to the respective levels of Dp  and Dq  (as 
long as DDD Pqp =+  and Hq D ≤ ). If there were a cost of developing the add-on, arbitrarily small in 
expectation, but with wide support, the optimal contract would backload payments through a two-part tariff 
with { }HPq DD ,min= , so as to provide the sponsor with maximal incentives to develop the add-on. The 
indeterminacy would be removed. 
 
 12
A separating equilibrium exists if and only if 
 ( ) ( ).,0, aad NDD ππ ≥  
 
A pooling equilibrium exists if and only if 
 ( ) ( ).,, ada DND πρπ ≥  
 
Finally, a semi-separating equilibrium exists if there exists ),0(ˆ ρρ ∈  such that  
 ( ) ( ).,ˆ, aad NDD ρππ =  
Lemma 1 (i) If multiple equilibria co-exist, both types of sponsor are better off in the one 
with the least amount of disclosure (the maximal amount of pooling). Furthermore, either 
the separating equilibrium exists and is unique, or the Pareto-dominant equilibrium is 
the pooling equilibrium. 
(ii) [Focusing on the Pareto-dominant equilibrium in case of multiplicity], there exists 
0>∗d  such that separation obtains for ∗< dd  and pooling for ∗≥ dd . 
Proof: (i)  Dπ  is belief-free. By contrast, the two types’ (common) payoff in the absence 
of disclosure is increasing in ρˆ . And so both prefer ρˆ  to be equal to ρ . More formally, 
either ( ) ( )aad NDD ,, ρππ >  and then the equilibrium is unique and separating. Or 
( ) ( )aad NDD ,, ρππ ≤  and then the pooling equilibrium exists and dominates any other 
equilibrium. 
(ii) This results from the fact that Dπ  is decreasing in d , while NDπ  does not depend on 
d . ?  
 
From now on, we will select the Pareto-dominant pooling equilibrium when it exists 
(when it does not, the separating equilibrium is the only equilibrium anyway). 
 
Proposition 2 (within equilibrium: disclosure positively correlated with ( )P,α )  
In (a separating) equilibrium, disclosure is associated with a) higher prices and b) lower 
user-friendliness of the selected SSO. 
 
Note that we focus on separating equilibria. There is no variation if pooling obtains. 
Intuitively, disclosure demonstrates the absence of hold up and thereby makes the 
technology more attractive.  Proposition 2 therefore is akin to Proposition 1 (the proofs of 
Propositions 2 through 4 can be found in the Appendix).  
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The next proposition shows that disclosure is akin to a concession in that more attractive 
standards are less likely to require disclosure. 
 
 
Proposition 3 (disclosure is less likely for an attractive standard)  
When the technology becomes less attractive ( a  falls), the range of disclosure costs for 
which disclosure occurs in equilibrium expands ( ∗d  grows). 
 
 
4.3 Positioning with limited SSO competition 
 
The analysis so far has made the extreme assumption that there is free entry into the SSO 
market and delivered a number of sharp implications, including the negative relationship 
between sponsor-friendliness and concessions. 
 
A finding that α  and c  co-vary negatively, though, might be attributed to the possibility 
that there is a limited number of SSOs for a given technology field and that user-friendly 
SSOs just demand more concessions.  To assess the validity of this alternative theory, it 
is important to distinguish two types of SSO policies: ex ante rules and ex post 
discretionary actions. User-friendly SSOs will naturally ex post demand more 
concessions.12 On the other hand, our empirical analysis focuses on the ex ante rules that 
govern applications to the SSO. As we now show, it is much less obvious that a more-
user-friendly SSO with market power will choose tougher rules. 
 
To illustrate this, we look at the case in which a fixed set of SSOs select concessions in 
order to attract a sponsor with known characteristic a  (and therefore preferred SSO  
( )a∗α  ). For expositional simplicity, we ignore disclosure decisions and return to the 
basic framework of Section 4.1. 
 
Our notion of competition can be interpreted as one among either for-profit SSOs that 
maximize revenue or not-for-profit SSOs that try to attract business; in either case, the 
SSO chooses c so as to solve  
 [ ] )()(1)(max                        )( cbFUI πα −=  
 
subject to 
 
0)( ≥++ cbma  
 
                                                 
12Whether they will indeed be successful in their attempt at “technology morphing” is another matter. To 
the extent that they delay approval, they may signal bad news to the users and so compromise the very 
acceptance of the standard by users even with increased concessions: see Lerner-Tirole (2006). 
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and  
 
.0)( =+++ ccba απ  
 
[A not-for-profit certifier tries to attract the sponsor's business; a for-profit one charges  ( ) =αP   max { }0),(max)( αα αα ′− ≠′ UU ; in either case, the certifier wants to maximize 
)(αU .] 
 
Proposition 4 shows that over a range of parameters, the concession is then increasing 
with sponsor-friendliness. It therefore precludes any general conclusion as to the negative 
co-variation between α  and c . Sponsor-friendly SSOs are ex post lenient (with regard to 
their choice of b*) and so must impose strong concessions (high c) in order to persuade 
consumers to adopt technologies that have weak appeal, and thereby attract such 
technologies.  User-friendly SSOs must demand low concessions in order to be attractive 
to sponsors of technologies with strong appeal. 
Proposition 4 (SSO positioning under imperfect SSO competition) 
Consider the competition between a given set of SSOs for a sponsor whose technology 
has appeal parameter a  and preferred SSO is thus ( )a∗∗ ≡αα . There exists ∗< αα   
such that for αα ≥  , the concession c made by SSO α  is increasing with α . That is, the 
sponsor must make fewer concessions when applying to the more user-friendly SSO.  
 
5. The sample 
 
Before testing the theory, we describe the construction of our sample.  Our empirical 
approach was to develop as comprehensive a sample of SSOs as possible.  To do this, we 
compiled data ourselves and also searched the Internet for information about these 
organizations and their policies. 
 
To identify the SSOs we would employ in our study, we employed “snowball sampling”, 
a popular form of non-probability sampling. Krathwohl (1997, p. 173) notes that 
“snowball sampling is used to discover the members of a group of individuals not 
otherwise easily identified by starting with someone in the know and asking for referrals 
to other knowledgeable individuals.” We first started off with the list in Lemley (2002). 
Lemley limited his population to groups that (a) disclosed their intellectual property 
policies in on-line documents or after direct contacts and (b) included Sun Microsystems 
as a member or an observer in the late 1990s. His judgment (p. 1903, and footnote 45) is 
that this method is representative of industries that he termed as “telecommunications and 
computer networking industries,” in which the most contentious IP issues arise. From this 
paper, we discovered a reference to another list at consortiuminfo.org. We employed all 
SSOs listed at consortiuminfo.org that related to information technology and 
communications technologies and disclosed their intellectual property policies in on-line 
documents or after direct contacts, including those that Lemley did not use (apparently 
because his second criteria was not satisfied). We also used a variety of other lists, 
including www.cenorm.be/isss/Consortiua/Surveyshort.htm, www.diffuse.org/fora.html, 
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www.webstart.com/cc.standards.html,13 and www.marinade.ltd.uk/content/standard.html. 
These additional lists had diminishing returns, and we stopped when we could not 
identify any additional lists which had any standards that met our criteria.  
 
We then coded the characteristics of the organizations based on the data collected from 
publicly available sources such as bylaws, charters, and websites of these bodies, as well 
as the authors’ survey, emails, and telephone interviews.14 Our final dataset is both from 
publicly available sources such as bylaws, charters, and websites of these bodies, as well 
as the authors’ survey, emails, and telephone interviews. In some cases, observations 
needed to be dropped after we could not obtain consistent answers to our questions.  
 
Our sample encompassed technologies related to the information technology, 
telecommunications, and electronics industries. More specifically, in the ISO Catalogue, 
each ISO standard is listed under a technological sub-field such as “computer graphics,” 
which is in turn under a technological field such as “information technology and office 
machines.” All but one of the SSOs in our sample fell into three technological fields 
(field number in parentheses): (31) Electronics; (33) Telecommunications, audio and 
video engineering; and (35) Information technology and office machines. In fact, 80% of 
the sample (47 out of 59) fall exclusively in these fields. 
 
Although non-probability sampling is very common due to its convenience, it poses a 
number of concerns. First, there is no clear-cut way to tell how representative in the 
statistical sense the sample is. Since there are relatively very few empirical works on 
SSOs and there is no comprehensive list containing all such organizations, however, we 
could not find a better alternative.  
 
To answer the question about whether our sample is big or small relative to the total, we 
provide here some references for comparison: 
 
1. http://www.cmpcmm.com/standards.html lists 141 entries of both standards and 
SSOs. A significant portion of which are standards, not SSOs. 
2. consortiuminfo.org lists 26 national, 10 international, and 11 regional SSOs. 
3. ILI standards database, which covers over 600,000 worldwide standards across 
many different technologies, claims to include over 250 major standards issuing 
authorities, from the U.S., Europe, Japan, Australia, and major international 
bodies.15  
4. PERINORM covers over 500,000 worldwide standards. It includes 21 national 
institutes.16  
                                                 
13 The link is now changed to http://www.cmpcmm.com/standards.html.  
14We created a survey website in June 2003. It is available at http://cess.nyu.edu/hfc/sso. We thank ISO for 
allowing us to base our survey on the ISO classification. The databases we used included those of Gale and 
ILI Infobase. 
 
15 http://englibrary.blogspot.com/2006/03/ili-standards-infobase.html.  
 
16 See http://www.cssinfo.com/perinorm.html, and http://www.bsi-
global.com/Business_Information/Publications/perinorm.xalter.  
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A second concern is our inability to observe SSOs that had failed prior to the data 
collection effort. All the SSOs in our sample were still in existence at the time of the 
data-collection effort, because those are the organizations that we could still collect data 
on their policies. (Failed SSOs typically do not maintain a website that allows one to 
learn their policies or key contacts.) A problem with such bias is that there could possibly 
be some characteristics of those organizations that could explain why they failed or had a 
short life which are not captured in our sample. 
  
Related to the sample bias question is the question of the independence of data. If, for 
instance, U.S. SSOs overwhelmingly followed the template developed by the American 
National Standards Institute—the body that, among other activities, accredits standards 
developers and represents the United States in the International Organization for 
Standardization—the statistical significance of our findings might be overstated. In fact, 
intellectual property policies of SSOs are very diverse. For instance, Lemley (2002, p. 
1904) writes: “What is most striking about the data is the significant variation in policies 
among the different SSOs.” This claim is illustrated in Table 1: along the dimensions 
summarized here (a subset of the intellectual property policies of SSOs), there are only 
two organizations (namely, DVB and IrDA) that have the same policies as ANSI.   
 
Table 1 provides an initial overview of the sample.  It lists the names of the 
organizations, their websites, and some additional information: 
 
• Whether the organization has a policy covering patents. 
• The rules regarding the licensing of patents by the SSO.  In particular, we 
highlight whether the SSO requires sponsors to commit to license this intellectual 
property on RAND terms, on a royalty-free basis, and two less-common variants: 
provisions that the sponsors assign their intellectual property to the SSO and that 
the SSO can compel licensing of the sponsors’ patents. 
• Whether sponsors must commit to abide by a formal dispute-resolution process. 
• Whether there are requirements to disclose relevant patents (and in some cases, 
applications) before the selection of the standard. 
 
It should be acknowledged that the uncertainty and pending litigation alluded to above 
implies that our characterization of SSO’s licensing rules is likely to face an errors-in-
variables problem. While the formal licensing policies can be observed, the extent to 
which these rules are enforceable remains in question. The Rambus decision discussed 
above and several others have engendered doubts about the enforceability of SSOs’ rules 
about intellectual property. 
 
6. The analysis 
 
We next present the analysis.  First, we discuss the proxies that we have developed for c, 
the measure of concessions demanded by the SSO, and α , the orientation of the SSO to 
sponsors relative to users.  We then explore their relationship.  We also consider the 
relationships between α , disclosure requirements, and the maturity of the technology. 
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6.1 The relationship between user-friendliness and concessions   
 
Table 2 summarizes the elements of the two indexes.  The first seeks to capture α , the 
extent to which the SSO is oriented to users or sponsors: 
 
• The nature of the organization.  Special interest groups (SIGs) are frequently 
observed to have a greater orientation to sponsors than other organizations.  The 
membership of these groups is frequently confined to intellectual property rights 
holders.17  Moreover, SIGs’ mandates frequently also include the marketing of 
these standards rather than just a dispassionate endorsement.  The contrast is 
sharpest between SIGs and standards development organizations (SDOs) like the 
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers.  An SIG has a narrower interest 
than an SDO.  Also, the specifications of an SIG are more likely to come from a 
single member, while SDOs build standards based on the contributions of various 
members.18  
• The nature of the membership.  Some SSOs have individual members, while 
others are confined to corporations.  (Yet others involve additional parties, such as 
academic institutions and government agencies.19) We regard SSOs with all-
corporate membership as higher-α organizations.20 
• The nature of the voting rules.21  In interviews with a number of practitioners, the 
importance of voting rules was highlighted.  The SSOs that required standards to 
                                                 
17In an illustrative e-mail, one informant writes that, “the working groups of our organization are comprised 
of members from many of the large industry leaders—therefore many of the companies that have an 
interest in IP protection are already stakeholders.” 
 
18It should be noted that there is also a third class of organization.  Fora, inasmuch as the organizations are 
involved in the standard-setting process, are frequently seen as a middle ground. As a platform for the 
exchange of information, members of fora facilitate, accelerate, and promote the general interoperability of 
products in an industry. Fora work with other SSOs to develop standards and improve the usability of 
standards by preparing implementation guidelines as recommendations to members on the usage of a 
standard.  While these organizations often seek to make use of existing standards whenever possible, they 
may also create their own standards or specifications.  Fora thus can be seen as both complements to and 
substitutes for other SSOs. 
 
19More than half of the organizations (57%) consist of corporations only. 8% consist of both individuals 
and corporations, and 25% consist of corporations and others. One organization consists of all three types 
of members. Almost all organizations (92%) have corporate members. 
 
20Our results continue to hold when we include organizations whose members are exclusively 
governmental bodies (which might be prone to pressure from national corporations) with the all-corporate 
firms. 
 
21The major sources of information here are the charters and bylaws on the websites of the organizations, 
and the survey. Sometimes, there is no specific decision process pertaining to standard setting. In that case, 
we assumed that the publicly available decision process, which pertains to general decisions, encompasses 
standard setting decisions also. If the organizations answered the voting rule question in our survey, the 
answers were used to compile the data. Otherwise, we compiled the data ourselves by reading the charters 
and bylaws of these organizations; we created a summary for each of these organizations. The summaries 
are archived at http://cess.nyu.edu/hfc/sso/decisionprocess.zip. 
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be approved by consensus or with a super-majority were seen as being much less 
prone to endorse a standard than those that use majority voting.22 
• The age of the organization.  Numerous observers (e.g., Cargill and Bolin (2004)) 
have observed that the standard-setting process has become increasingly 
politicized over time.  These observers have attributed this trend to the growing 
involvement of lawyers and business development personnel in an activity that 
had been previously dominated by engineers.  (See Simcoe (2003) for empirical 
support of this claim.)  While many established organizations have adjusted their 
rules to accommodate the interests of the sponsors, these changes have frequently 
been slow.  Discussions suggest that rules have been slanted in a more pro-
sponsor direction most dramatically in the more recently established SSOs.  
(These newer organizations have lacked the institutional traditions that have 
served to slow the pace of change in older groups.23) We expect SSOs established 
after the median date in the sample (1995) to have a higher α.  
 
It is difficult to assign a relative importance to these four elements.  We thus simply—in 
an admittedly imperfect approximation—sum these four dummies, and create an α score 
between zero and four.  In diagnostic regressions below, we also look at each element 
separately. 
 
We similarly create an index of c, the number of concessions offered by the sponsor.  We 
focus on the two elements identified as most critical in our discussions, the commitments 
regarding licensing and the allocation of residual decision-making rights:24 
 
• Licensing restrictions.25 In a number of SSOs, firms must commit to license key 
intellectual property needed to implement the standard to those who request it.  
These commitments typically take two forms: the firm commits to license the 
patents either on a royalty-free basis, or on RAND terms.  While ambiguities 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
2234% and 27% of organizations use majority voting rules and super-majority to approve standards, 
respectively. 13% of organizations use consensus. There is no information for the remaining 25% of 
organizations. 
 
23All of the organizations adopting the consensus rule are significantly older than the majority of 
organizations. Note that nearly half of the organizations in our sample were founded between 1996 and 
2002, and 73% of them are less than 15 years old. 
 
24Organizations vary in the extent to which they disclosed historical information. While some organizations 
carefully archive earlier policy documents, in many cases only contemporaneous policies are available. 
Thus, when coding these policies, we simply focused on the policies that were in place in October 2002. 
We ignored proposed alterations to these policies when available in draft form, focusing instead on policies 
actually in place. 
 
25Organizations typically define (a) the rules (e.g., RAND licensing requirements) governing the 
intellectual property, and (b) the range of covered intellectual property. Almost all organizations (96%) 
include patents among the intellectual property policies covered under their rules. About half of the 
organizations (45%) have policies governing trademarks, 77% copyrights, and 39% other types of 
intellectual property rights. 
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surround exactly how binding a RAND licensing commitment is, most observers 
see it as a serious commitment, though clearly not as restrictive as a promise to 
provide royalty-free license (see Lemley (2002)).  We include two dummies: one 
that takes on the value one if the firm must commit to provide royalty-free 
licenses, and one that takes on the value one if they must commit to either RAND 
or royalty-free licenses.26  We include compulsory licensing and patent 
assignment requirements as equivalent to royalty-free licensing for the purposes 
of this analysis.27 
• Residual decision rights.  In many SSOs, there is no clear road map to resolving 
disputes.  In others, however, the firms must commit to bringing their disputes 
before an adjudicary body of the SSO.28 
 
Again, we create an index of concessions, which ranges from zero to two. 
 
The final two measures reported in Table 2 relate to the extent of disclosure in the SSO.  
As highlighted in Section 4.2, the predictions here will be somewhat different from those 
for other concessions because of the adverse selection effect.  We report whether the 
sponsors were required to disclose either patent awards or applications prior to the 
adoption of a standard. 
 
Table 2 reports the results of this analysis.  While not all cross-tabulations between the 
proxies for α and c are statistically significant, the basic pattern is clear: in every case, the 
level of concessions, c, is higher for those with a lower proxy for α, that is, a greater 
orientation towards users.  When we add together the α dummies in the final two 
columns, we see in each case the difference is significant at the five-percent confidence 
level.  For instance, for SSOs that require royalty-free licenses, the α score is 0.6; for the 
others, it is 1.6.  For SSOs requiring binding dispute resolution, the α score is 0.4; for the 
others, it is again 1.6. 
 
The results regarding the disclosure requirements are much less clear-cut.  Only one of 
the ten cross-tabulations is significant, and that only at the ten-percent confidence level.  
The summed α scores are also not significantly different from each other. 
 
                                                 
26It is worth highlighting that many crucial details are often not stipulated in these contracts. The case Intel 
v. VIA Technologies (174 F.Supp. 2d 1038 (N.D. Cal. 2001)), for instance, revolved around the question of 
whether the licensing commitment entered into as part of a standard covered just the basic features of the 
standard or else also included various extensions. Some of the loopholes that firms have successfully 
exploited are cataloged in Feldman, et al. (2000) and Kipnis (2000). 
 
27The majority (63%) of organizations use RAND in their patent licensing rules. Only 9% of organizations 
use royalty-free rules. Even fewer organizations use assignment (2%) and compulsory rules (2%). We also 
repeat the analysis with a third dummy that takes on the value one for those SSOs that require patent 
assignment (which might be seen as particularly taxing).  The results are little changed.  
 
28Our data show that only 9% of organizations have a dispute resolution mechanism. It should be noted that 
in some cases, separate provisions govern copyright licensing, but we have not recorded these. 
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In Table 3, we look at the correlations between the α and c proxies.  There is a strong 
negative correlation between the scores, -0.53, which is highly statistically significant: 
that is, more user-friendly SSOs offer more concessions.  We also examine the 
correlation between these two scores and the individual elements of the other index.  
These correlations are each statistically significant, at least at the ten-percent confidence 
level.  Once again, no significant relationship between the disclosure policies and the α 
score appears. 
 
We next turn to regression analyses.  In Table 4, we seek to explain the extent of 
concessions offered by an SSO, given its level of user-friendliness.  (This assumption of 
the exogeneity of α is plausible if we assume free entry. As the tabulations of the 
frequency of other SSOs in the technological sub-fields of our sample discussed below 
reveal, this assumption does not appear unreasonable. If it did not hold, we should 
probably regard this as more representative of correlation than causation.)  In each case, 
we estimate first a basic specification, and then with (unreported) dummy variables that 
control for the technologies covered by the SSO. (We determine these first by checking 
the ILI Infobase, which classifies the standards published by the SSOs according to the 
ISO technological fields—a scheme used in the International Organization for 
Standardization’s ISO Catalogue.29  For SSOs not included in the database, we ask the 
organizations to respond to our survey, filling out the number of standards they published 
in each field and sub-field.  For non-responding SSOs, we make our own classification, 
based on information from the mission statements or elsewhere on the organizations’ 
websites.)  We employ ordered logit regressions throughout, reflecting the fact that while 
we expect that an organization with a c score of 2 is more restrictive than that with a 
score of 1, it is difficult to say exactly how much more restrictive it is. 
 
The table reveals again that there is a strong relationship between c and α, even after we 
add industry controls.  When we examine the individual elements of α, we see that while 
all the coefficients are negative, the two consistently significant indicators are if the 
standards body is an SIG and if all the members are corporations. 
 
When we look at the determinants of the three individual components of the c score in 
Table 5, we see that the α score is consistently negative in each.  Moreover, each 
coefficient is statistically significant at least at the five-percent confidence level.  When 
we look at the two disclosure measures, we find that not only is the α coefficient 
statistically insignificant, but it takes on a different sign. 
 
6.2 Additional analyses 
 
In this section, we look at three additional predictions of our model.  These relate to the 
relationships between disclosure requirements and licensing price, the impact of limited 
competition between SSOs, and the consequences of the differing maturity of standards. 
                                                 
29This is available on-line at http://www.iso.org/iso/en/CatalogueListPage.CatalogueList (accessed October 
10, 2004). See also “How are ISO Standards Developed?”, 
http://www.iso.org/iso/en/stdsdevelopment/whowhenhow/how.html (accessed August 21, 2004). 
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First, as was discussed in Section 4 above, we also hypothesize a relationship between 
disclosure and price.  In particular, Proposition 2 suggested that within an equilibrium, a 
higher licensing price was associated with more disclosure. 
 
In Table 6, we look at the two most commonly encountered terms relating to licensing 
fees and their relationship with the disclosure provisions.  We find that the presence of a 
provision mandating royalty-free licensing is negatively associated with the presence of a 
disclosure requirement, while RAND licensing is strongly associated with such a 
requirement.  The pattern goes the same way in both the analysis of the disclosure of 
patent awards and applications, but it is much stronger in the former case.  
 
The pattern of more disclosure being associated with higher licensing rates in Table 6 is 
broadly consistent with the theoretical predictions above. The fact that the relationship is 
stronger for patent awards is also consistent with our predictions. Lemma 1 states that if 
the disclosure cost is high, then it is more likely that there will be pooling with no 
disclosure, making the relationship overall weaker. Since it is plausible to assume that the 
disclosure cost is higher for patent applications than for awards, this pattern is also 
expected. 
 
Second, as noted above, an alternative hypothesis for the relationship between c and α is 
that the patterns are due to market power.  It may be that some SSOs have few 
competitors.  As a result, they may be able to demand more concessions from sponsors, 
while having a much more user-orientated approach.  As shown in Section 4.3, this 
argument, while initially plausible, does not bear up under scrutiny.  As Proposition 4 
showed, when there are a limited number of SSOs, it is by no means clear that the 
relationship between α and c will still hold. 
 
We address this issue in two ways.  First, we rerun the regressions in Table 4, simply 
adding a proxy for the market power of each SSO. The proxy we employ is the density of 
other SSOs in the same technological sub-field(s) as a given SSO.30  If the sponsor can 
turn to many other SSOs, then it is unlikely that the SSO can impose these types of 
requirements.  We determine this measure again through the ILI Infobase, using the 
classification scheme in the International Organization for Standardization’s ISO 
Catalogue.31 In general, the density of SSOs is quite high.  The mean SSO has 13.9 other 
SSOs in its sub-field (with a median of 13.5).  
 
We check to see whether once this control is added, the relationship between α and c still 
holds.  Then, we compare the goodness-of-fit in regressions when SSOs do and do not 
have considerable competition.  
                                                 
30For instance, if an organization is active in sub-fields A and B, and there are 3 and 4 active organizations 
in A and B, respectively, then the market power index for this organization is (3 + 4)*1/2. 
 
31Of course, the sponsor may have the option to create a new SSO, a possibility that our measure can only 
imperfectly capture.  
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Table 7 presents the results of the analysis.  In the first four regressions, we examine the 
impact of adding the measure of SSO density in the technological sub-field.  We find the 
measure has little impact: across all four regressions (and numerous unreported ones), it 
is not statistically or economically significant.  As before, there is a strong negative 
association between c and α. 
 
We then compare the goodness-of-fit in regressions using SSOs that did and did not have 
market power.  We divide the SSOs into those where there was above and below the 
median number of other SSOs in their technological sub-fields.  In the reported 
regressions (and in numerous unreported ones), the goodness-of-fit is higher when we use 
SSOs located in sub-fields with many other organizations: the absolute t-statistics of the 
independent variables of interest are larger, the χ2-statistics are more statistically 
significant, and the log likelihoods are smaller.  This is particularly striking in the last 
pair of regressions reported in Table 7.  When using those SSOs with above-median 
density, three of four c-score elements are statistically significant; when using those 
below the median density, none are.  This pattern is consistent with the predictions of 
Proposition 4.      
 
The final analysis in Table 8 examines the relationship between the maturity of the 
standards in the technology where the SSO is operating and the α measure.  We believe 
that the best indicator of opportunity is not the maturity of the project per se, but rather 
the collective state of projects in that particular technological sub-field.  Over time, many 
of the substantial technological uncertainties about standards in a sub-field are likely to 
be resolved, increasing its attractiveness.  If a field is less developed, it would be more 
difficult for technical committees to come up with standard proposals or drafts that take 
into account all technological implications, thus lengthening the approval time of 
standards in the field. Alternatively, there may be a higher option value to sponsors from 
delaying their decision to participate, as suggested in Farhi, et al. (2005). We thus use the 
maturity level of standards in a technological field as a proxy for the standard’s 
attractiveness to users.   
 
We compute the maturity of the technological sub-field(s) in which each standard 
operates as follows. Following the procedure outlined above, we assign each organization 
to one or more sub-fields as delineated in the ISO Catalogue.  We then construct the 
maturity level for each of the sub-fields by summing up the maturity ranks of all other 
standards in the sub-field and dividing the sum by the number of standards in each sub-
field. We use the ISO’s rating of maturity, which indicates the maturity of that standard 
on a scale of 0 (“preliminary stage”) to 99 (standard withdrawn after being implemented).  
We compute the average maturity of the standards in that category.  If there are no 
standards in a sub-field, it receives the least mature rank.  If an organization spans across 
fields or sub-fields, we compute a simple average of the maturity levels for all relevant 
fields or sub-fields.32  
 
                                                 
32In principle, we could have calculated a weighted average but since we do not have information for the 
number of standards of most of the organizations, we have not pursued this approach. 
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Table 8 reports that there appears to be a positive correlation between maturity and α.  
The first panel indicates that SSOs operating in sub-fields where standards are above the 
median maturity tend to have a significantly higher α.  The second panel presents an 
ordered logit regression, with the α score of the SSO as the dependent variable.  Once 
again, a higher maturity score is significantly associated with a higher α, consistent with 
the theoretical predictions delineated above. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Standard-setting organizations have received surprisingly little empirical scrutiny, despite 
their economic importance and dynamism. This paper seeks to address this omission, 
empirically examining a cross-section sample of nearly 60 SSOs.  
 
From Lerner-Tirole (2006), we expected a negative relationship between the extent to 
which an SSO is oriented to technology sponsors and the concession level required of 
sponsors. In this paper, we indeed find a significant negative relationship, even when we 
control for industry effects. We also expected the sponsor-friendliness of the selected 
SSO to be positively associated with the quality of a standard. The data reveal a 
statistically significant association between sponsor-friendliness and the maturity of a 
technological sub-field in which the standard is located, which we suggest should be a 
proxy for attractiveness.  
 
Our theoretical analysis of disclosure requirements predicts that a higher licensing price 
should be associated with more disclosure.  Empirically, we find that the presence of a 
provision mandating royalty-free licensing is negatively associated with the presence of a 
disclosure requirement, while weaker “reasonable” licensing provisions are strongly 
associated with such a requirement. Second, we show that in settings where there are only 
a limited number of SSOs, the relationship between concessions and user-friendliness 
may not hold. When we divide our sample of SSOs into those where there were above 
and below the median number of other SSOs in their technological sub-field, we find that 
the relationship between user-friendliness and concessions is considerably tighter among 
SSOs located in classes with many other SSOs. 
 
This work leaves a number of questions unexplored. One of the most intriguing of these 
has to do with the dynamics of certification.  Lerner-Tirole (2006) and the extensions 
discussed here present a static model in which a one-time decision is made.  In the real 
world, SSOs and sponsors may employ more complex strategies: for instance, a sponsor 
may reapply to an SSO after its initial application is rejected. (Farhi, et al. (2006) presents 
a theoretical look at these issues.) Understanding the dynamics of the certification 
process represents an important empirical challenge. 
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Appendix 1:  Proof of Proposition 2  
 
Compare the two programs 
 ( )
( )( ){ } ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]{ },1max, 01 dbmHabFHambbad
D −+++−
+−≥
= ∗∗
−∗∗
ππ  
 
and  
 
( )
( ){ } ( )[ ] ( )[ ]{ }.ˆˆ1ˆˆ max,0 01 bmabFambbaND ++−−≥= − ππ  
 
a) Let us first demonstrate that disclosure is associated with a higher price in a separating 
equilibrium. Let us assume a contrario that PND > PD. This inequality can arise only if 
0>NDP .  Because PND > 0, then 1=NDα  and so the cut-off bˆ  is the efficient cut-off. By 
contrast, 1≤Dα  (with equality if PD > 0) and so the cut-off *b  is either efficient or 
socially too high. Thus we have: bb ˆ* ≥ .  And so  
( )[ ] ( )[ ] .0ˆ* >+−++=− bmabmHaPP NDD  
b) Let us show that NDD αα ≥ . This is clearly the case when 0>DP , as then 1=Dα  and 
1≤NDα . So, assume that 0== NDD PP . Using the users’ and the SSO’s indifference 
equations, one then gets: ( ) ( ) 0ˆ* =+=++ bmabmHa  
and  
 
( ) [ ] 0ˆ 00 =++=−+++ ∗ παπα NDD badbHa  
 
implying that  
 ( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ] dbbmbbm DNDD απαα +−−−=− ˆˆ**0 ,  
 
which together with 1<′m  and bb ˆ* <  yields .NDD αα >     ?  
 
Appendix 2:  Proof of Proposition 3 
 
Recall that ∗d  is given by  
 ( ) ( ).,, aad NDD ρππ =∗  
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Let DP  and NDP  denote the prices under disclosure, and non-disclosure and pooling, 
respectively (beware that NDP  is not the same as in Proposition 2, as we are now looking 
at pooling rather than separating).  The same proof as for Proposition 2 shows that 
NDD PP ≥ .   
Suppose, first, that 0== NDD PP . Then, for ∗= dd ,  
 ( )( )[ ]( ) ( )( )[ ] 0101 11 πρπ HamFdHamF −−−=−−−− −∗−  
 
and so ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−−−−=
−−
−−−
−=∂
−∂
**0
*
0**
*
0
)(
1
ˆ)ˆ(
1)]ˆ(1[
)(1ˆˆ
ˆ1
bbmbbm
bF
d
bbm
bF
bbm
bF
a
DND
π
ππππ
 
(using the fact that ( )bmm Ff −=′ −1  ). Because ( )[ ]bbm −  is decreasing and  *ˆ bb > , 
  ( ) .0>∂ −∂ a
DND ππ  
 
Thus, there is disclosure for a smaller set of disclosure costs as a  increases. 
 
Suppose, next, that 0>≥ NDD PP . Then NDD ππ =  requires that Hd )1(* ρ−=  and 
*ˆ bb = . Furthermore,  
 ( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ] 01ˆ1 * =−−−=∂ −∂ bFbFa DND ππ . 
 
Finally, assume that 0=> NDD PP . Then  
 
( )[ ] ( ) .1ˆˆˆ1)(
*
0 ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−
+−−∝∂
−∂
bbm
PdbF
a
DDND πππ  
 
But using the efficiency condition,  
 ( ) .0 ∗∗∗ −=+− bbmPd Dπ  
 
Finally, 1<′m  and bb ˆ* <  implies that ( ) .0>∂ −∂ a
DND ππ     ?  
 
Appendix 3:  Proof of Proposition 4 
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Proof: Consider a sponsor of a technology with known attractiveness a . Let ∗α  denotes 
his “ideal SSO,” and ),( ∗∗ cb  denote the corresponding cut-off and concession level: 
 
⎪⎪
⎪
⎩
⎪⎪
⎪
⎨
⎧
=′+
=+++
=++
∗∗
∗∗∗∗
∗∗
.0)(1
0)(
0)(
c
ccba
cbma
πα
πα  
 
An SSO with type ∗≠ αα  attempts to offer as high a surplus  [ ] )()(1 cbF π−  as it can. If 
∗>αα , the SSO lacks credibility in the eyes of users and must make a high concession to 
gain sufficient credibility:  
 
.∗> cc  
 
To see this, suppose, to the contrary, that ∗≤ cc . Then letting b  denote the cut-off for  
),( αc : 
 
0)( =+++ ccba απ  
 
and  
 
0)( ≥++ cbma  
 
if the standard is to be adopted by users. And so 
  
,)()()()( ∗∗∗∗ −=>≥− bbmccbbm πααπ  
 
which, together with 1<′m  , yields ∗< bb  . But then  
 
,0)()( =++<++ ∗∗ cbmacbma  
 
and so the standard is not adopted by users after all. Note also that for ∗>αα , the two 
constraints in program (I) must be binding; otherwise, the first-order condition would 
yield: 
 
.0)1(
1
=′+−+
′ παπ
π
F
f   (4) 
 
But *αα > , ∗> cc , 0<′′π  and ( ) 01 =′+ ∗∗ cπα  imply that the left-hand side of (4) is 
strictly negative. 
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Similarly for ∗<αα , but “not too small”, the two constraints in program (I) must be 
binding. For α  close to ∗α , (4) would yield c  far below ∗c , which by continuity cannot 
be the solution.33 
 
Now, when the two constraints are binding, 
 
,0)()(1 =++−−+ − cccama απ  
and so  
.
)1(1 πα
π
α ′+−= ′md
dc  
Now 01 <′+ πα  for ∗>αα , and )1( πα ′+  small for α  smaller than, but in 
neighborhood of, ∗α . Hence  0>αddc .       ?  
 
 
                                                 
33 To show that the highest gross sponsor payoff cannot decrease discontinuously as α  decreases, suppose 
that SSO α  offers concession c so that the standard is adopted if recommended by the SSO (if not, then 
obviously the payoff cannot decrease as it is equal to 0): 
0)( ≥++ cbma  
.0)( =++ cba απ  
Now consider SSO (α  - dα ) with  dα >0. It is easy to see that for concession c+dc the cutoff is b+db 
with 
 ,)()( dccdcdb πααπ ′−=  
and that the users still adopt as long as 
.
)()(1
)()(
cmc
dbmcdc ′′−
′−≥ πα
απ  
 Table 1 Sample Overview 
 
         
  Patents Covered by External Patent Licensing Rules Dispute Resolution  Disclosure 
Standard Development Organization Address  Organization Policy RAND Royalty Free Assignment Compulsory Mechanism Requirements 
         
ANSI www.ansi.org Y Y N N N Y Y 
ATM Forum www.atmforum.com Y N N N N N Y 
BCDF www.bcdforum.org Y Y N N N N Y 
BioAPI  www.bioapi.org Y Y Y N N N Y 
BPMI www.bpmi.org Y N N N N N N 
BSI www.bsi-global.com Y N N N Y Y N 
CEN www.cenorm.be Y Y N N N N Y 
CPExchange www.cpexchange.org Y N N Y N N N 
DCMI dublincore.org N N N N N N N 
DMTF www.dmtf.org Y Y N N N N Y 
DVB www.dvb.org Y Y N N N Y Y 
ECMA www.ecma.ch Y Y N N N N Y 
ECTF www.ectf.org Y Y N N N N Y 
EDIFICE www.edifice.org NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
ETIS www.etis.org Y Y N N N N Y 
ETSI www.etsi.org Y M N N N Y Y 
Frame Relay Forum www.frforum.com Y Y N N N N Y 
GEA  www.gigabit-ethernet.org Y Y N N N N Y 
Home Plug  www.homeplug.org Y Y N N N M N 
Home PNA www.homepna.org Y Y N N N N Y 
HomeRF www.homerf.org Y Y N N N N N 
I2O www.i2osig.org Y N Y N N N N 
IEEE www.ieee.org Y Y N N N N Y 
IETF www.ietf.org Y Y N N N N Y 
IMTC www.imtc.org Y N N N N N Y 
Internet Home Alliance www.internethomealliance.com Y N N N N N N 
IrDA www.irda.org  Y Y N N N Y Y 
ISO www.iso.ch Y Y N N N N Y 
ITU-T www.itu.int/ITU-T Y Y N N N N Y 
MEF www.metroethernetforum.org Y Y N N N N Y 
MSF www.msforum.org Y Y N N N N Y 
MWIF www.mwif.org Y N N N N N Y 
NMF (Telemanagement Forum) www.nmf.org  Y Y N N N N Y 
NPF www.npforum.org Y Y N N N N Y 
NSIF www.atis.org/atis/sif/sifhom.htm  Y Y N N N N Y 
OASIS www.oasis-open.org Y N N N N N N 
OGC www.opengis.org Y Y N N N M Y 
OIF www.oiforum.com Y Y N N N N Y 
OMA www.openmobilealliance.org Y Y N N N N Y 
OMG www.omg.org Y Y N N N N Y 
Open Group www.opengroup.org Y Y N N N N Y 
OSDL www.osdl.org N N N N N N N 
OSGi www.osgi.org Y Y N N N N Y 
PCCA www.pcca.org  Y N N N N N Y 
PCI SIG www.pcisig.com  Y Y N N N N Y 
RDMA www.rdmaconsortium.org Y Y N N N N Y 
RosettaNet www.rosettanet.org Y N Y N N N N 
SDMI www.sdmi.org  Y N N N N N Y 
SNIA www.snia.org  Y Y N N N N Y 
STA www.scsita.org Y N N N N N Y 
TIA www.tiaonline.org/standards Y Y N N N N Y 
UPNP www.upnp.org Y Y N N N N Y 
W3C www.w3.org Y N Y N N N Y 
WAP Forum www.wapforum.org Y Y N N N N Y 
WfMC www.wfmc.org Y N Y N N N Y 
Wired for Management developer.intel.com/ial/wfm/wfmspecs.htm Y N Y N N N N 
X.org www.x.org NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
XIWT www.xiwt.org Y N N N N N Y 
XML.org www.oasis-open.org Y N N N N N N 
         
 
Y= Yes; N= No; M- Maybe; NA= Not Available. 
 Table 2 Chi-Squared and t-Test Analyses of the Relationship Between α and c Score Elements, as well as Disclosure Measures 
 
             
 ALPHA SCORE ELEMENT (HIGHER ALPHA CHOICE IS THE LEFT COLUMN) ALPHA SCORE (0 TO 4) 
 
Is this an SIG (SIGs 
and SSOs only)? Is this an SIG (all)? 
All members 
corporate? 
Decisions made 
by majority rule? 
Younger 
organization? If element is… 
 Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
             
c Score Elements             
Royalty free licensing? 10% 14% 10% 13% 0% 24%*** 5% 16% 7% 17% 0.6 1.6** 
Royalty free or RAND licensing? 40% 83%*** 40% 80%*** 59% 87%** 65% 77% 69% 77% 1.3 2.1*** 
Binding dispute resolution? 0% 15% 0% 11% 8% 10% 0% 14% 0% 18%** 0.4 1.6** 
             
             
Disclosure Measures             
Is patent disclosure required? 60% 80% 60% 81% 75% 79% 79% 76% 68% 86%* 1.4 1.9 
Is application disclosure required? 20% 26% 20% 24% 26% 21% 32% 19% 8% 30% 1.5 1.5 
             
 
*** denotes significant at the 1% confidence level; **, 5%; *, 10%. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 Correlation Analysis between Alpha and c Scores and their Elements, as well as Disclosure Measures 
 
           
 Alpha score (0 to 4) Is this an SIG? All members corporate? Decisions made by majority rule? Younger organization? 
 Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value 
           
c Score (0 to 3) -0.53 0.000 -0.32 0.018 -0.43 0.001 -0.25 0.071 -0.27 0.050 
Royalty free licensing? -0.31 0.017         
Royalty free or RAND licensing? -0.36 0.005         
Binding dispute resolution? -0.31 0.023         
           
Is patent award disclosure required? -0.18 0.190         
Is patent application disclosure required? 0.01 0.987         
           
 
 
 Table 4 Ordered Logit Regression Analysis of c Score, with α Score and its Elements 
as Explanatory Variables 
 
 Dependent Variable: c Score 
     
α score -1.13 -1.36   
 [0.30]*** [0.35]***   
Is this an SIG?   -1.85 -2.04 
   [0.81]** [0.83]** 
Are all members corporate?   -1.71 -1.79 
   [0.67]** [0.70]*** 
Decisions made by majority rule?   -0.74 -0.92 
   [0.62] [0.64] 
Younger organization?   -0.66 -1.09 
   [0.60] [0.65]* 
     
Dummies for technology included? N Y N Y 
     
Chi-Squared Statistic 17.41 23.89 19.99 25.73 
p-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Log Likelihood -47.67 -44.43 -46.38 -43.51 
Number of Observations 55 55 55 55 
     
 
t-Statistics in brackets. 
*** denotes significant at the 1% confidence level; **, 5%; *, 10%. 
 
 
 Table 5 Logit Regression Analysis of Elements of c Score and Disclosure Elements, with α Score as Explanatory Variable 
 
 Dependent Variable 
 
Royalty-free 
licensing? 
Royalty-free or 
RAND licensing? 
Binding dispute 
resolution? 
Is patent 
disclosure required? 
Is application 
disclosure required? 
           
α score -1.15 -1.19 -0.82 -0.97 -1.43 -2.10 -0.39 -0.29 0.01 0.17 
 [0.53]** [0.56]** [0.32]*** [0.36]*** [0.72]** [1.03]** [0.29] [0.30] [0.29] [0.32] 
           
Dummies for technology included? N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y 
           
Chi-Squared Statistic 6.51 9.49 7.85 9.88 6.32 11.05 1.77 6.41 0.00 3.25 
p-Value 0.011 0.024 0.005 0.020 0.012 0.026 0.183 0.093 0.966 0.355 
Log Likelihood -17.98 -15.20 -30.56 -27.52 -13.59 -11.22 -29.72 -27.40 -30.07 -28.45 
Number of Observations 57 48 57 53 55 55 57 57 55 55 
           
 
t-Statistics in brackets. 
*** denotes significant at the 1% confidence level; **, 5%; *, 10%. 
 
 
 Table 6 Chi-Squared Analyses of c Score Elements Regarding Price and 
Disclosure Measures 
 
 
Is award 
disclosure required? 
Is application 
disclosure required? 
 Yes No Yes No 
     
Royalty-free licensing? 5% 38%*** 0% 17% 
RAND licensing? 77% 15%** 85% 57%* 
     
 
*** denotes significant at the 1% confidence level; **, 5%; *, 10%. 
 
 
 Table 7 Ordered Logit Regression Analysis of c Score, with Market Power Proxy 
 
 Dependent Variable: c Score 
 Using Entire Sample Dividing Sample into Above and Below Median SSO Density 
     Above Below Above Below 
         
α score -1.12 -1.35   -1.55 -1.32   
 [0.30]*** [0.35]***   [0.56]*** [0.54]**   
Is this an SIG?   -1.84 -2.08   -2.15 -35.79 
   [0.81]** [0.83]**   [1.11]* [229.07] 
Are all members corporate?   -1.74 -1.83   -2.38 -1.64 
   [0.68]*** [0.71]***   [1.13]** [1.12] 
Decisions made by majority rule?   -0.69 -0.82   -0.37 -1.45 
   [0.62] [0.66]   [0.99] [1.23] 
Younger organization?   -0.61 -1.05   -2.09 -0.60 
   [0.61] [0.65]   [1.07]* [0.94] 
Density of other SSOs -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04     
 [0.06] [0.07] [0.06] [0.07]     
         
Dummies for technology included? N Y N Y Y Y Y Y 
         
Chi-Squared Statistic 17.53 23.95 20.36 26.07 13.56 9.84 15.69 12.91 
p-Value 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.043 0.008 0.074 
Log Likelihood -47.61 -44.41 -46.20 -43.35 -18.91 -24.04 -17.85 -22.51 
Number of Observations 55 55 55 55 29 26 29 26 
         
 
t-Statistics in brackets. 
*** denotes significant at the 1% confidence level; **, 5%; *, 10%. 
 
 
 Table 8 t-Test and Ordered Logit Regression 
Analysis of α Score, with Maturity Proxy as 
Explanatory Variable 
 
  
α if mature 1.7 
α if not mature 1.1 
t-Statistic 1.92 
p-Value 0.060 
  
 
Dependent Variable: 
α Score 
  
Mature technology -1.00 
 [0.54]* 
  
Chi-Squared Statistic 3.45 
p-Value 0.063 
Log Likelihood -81.88 
Number of Observations 58 
  
 
t-Statistics in brackets. 
*** denotes significant at the 1% confidence level; **, 5%; *, 10%. 
 
 
